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SCHWARZENEGGER VS. BOBBLEHEADS:
THE CASE FOR SCHWARZENEGGER
Charles J. Harder
Henry L. Self III*
I. INTRODUCTION
A person who runs for, or holds, political office does not
forfeit his property rights. His house is not suddenly taken
away, his bank accounts are not seized, and his right to con-
trol the commercial use of his identity-also a property
right'-does not disappear. When Arnold Schwarzenegger
announced his intent to run for governor of California on Au-
gust 6, 2003 during The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, and
when he was elected on October 7, 2003, he did not give up
his property rights, including his right to control the commer-
cial use of his name, image and identity.
Before August 2003, when Schwarzenegger was a "non-
politician," no one disputed his right to control the commer-
cial use of his highly valuable name and image. If a company,
without permission, used his image in an advertisement, or
manufactured and sold a product bearing his name, image or
even a sound-alike of his voice, Schwarzenegger was entitled
to stop the infringement pursuant to his rights of publicity,
and to seek compensation for the commercial value of the
misappropriation. Schwarzenegger enforced those rights vig-
orously. Now that he has entered politics, those rights re-
main, and his commitment to protecting against the unau-
" Charles J. Harder and Henry L. Self III are attorneys at Lavely & Singer in
Los Angeles, California, litigation counsel for Arnold Schwarzenegger and his
companies. Lavely & Singer specializes in all aspects of talent-side entertain-
ment litigation, including right of publicity and intellectual property law. The
firm represents primarily actors, recording artists, sports figures, writers, direc-
tors, and producers, as well as politicians and other public figures.
1. "The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intellectual
property ...." Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal.
2001); see also Pooley v. Nat'l Hole-In-One Ass'n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (D.
Az. 2000) (right of publicity is considered a property right).
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thorized commercial use of his name and image continues.
For the reasons discussed below,2 Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger, and for that matter any politician, has the same right to
control the commercial use of his name, image and identity as
does any other person, whether a motion picture or television
star, recording artist, sports figure, celebrity by some other
means, or even a non-celebrity. The law distinguishes be-
tween legitimate uses of a person's name, image and identity
that constitute a valid exercise of free expression, and com-
mercial uses that are intended merely to generate profit.
Because the case at issue regarding the Schwarzenegger
bobblehead dolls was brought in California, this article fo-
cuses on the "transformative use" test, first enunciated by the
state Supreme Court in 2001,' which is currently employed by
California courts in publicity rights cases. Under this test,
the bobblehead dolls and packaging at issue are not "trans-
formative," and thus actionable, because they do not repre-
sent a "significant transformation" of Schwarzenegger's name
and likeness. Rather, the dolls and packaging at issue are
primarily, if not entirely, a depiction and imitation of
Schwarzenegger, and were created and sold by the doll com-
pany in order to profit from an unauthorized use of Schwar-
zenegger's name and likeness, which have tremendous value
in the marketplace.
II. THE PRODUCT AND PACKAGING
Ohio Discount Merchandise, Inc. ("ODM") profits from
using the publicity rights of famous people, many of them po-
litical figures, by manufacturing and selling "bobblehead"
dolls bearing the names and images of famous people.4 Sales
2. See discussion infra Parts II-IV.
3. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808.
4. "Bobbleheads" are collectible figures about seven inches tall with spring-
mounted heads that bob up and down. Originally marketed in the mid-20th
century, bobbleheads depicting athletes emerged as a significant sports memo-
rabilia craze in the late 1990s and went on to become a full-fledged pop culture
phenomenon in the early 2000s. See Bill Shaikin, Statues ofImitation: Bobble-
head Dolls Are Back, Igniting First Sports Collectible Craze of New Century,
L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2001, at D5. Manufacturers began selling bobbleheads de-
picting thousands of different sports players, celebrities, and fictional charac-
ters, from the Osbournes to SpongeBob Squarepants and even Jesus Christ. See
James Sullivan, No longer just sports souvenirs, bobbleheads are springing off
the shelves, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 29, 2002, at El, E5.
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are made directly from ODM's website, on eBay and other
such Internet outlets, and occasionally in retail stores.5
ODM's dolls carry no political speech; they make no political
statement. Rather, they are a means for the company to
profit by selling a product with commercial value-value de-
rived not from the usefulness of the product, or the creativity
of the design, or a "message" on or within the product. The
commercial value of the products is derived solely or primar-
ily from the name and image of the famous persons depicted
by the products. ODM of course does not own the names and
likenesses that give its products commercial value, rather,
those property rights are held by the famous persons por-
trayed in the products, people like Schwarzenegger and oth-
ers. The rights are theirs alone to protect or license, at their
sole discretion.6
In 2004, ODM began to manufacture and sell a bobble-
head doll of Schwarzenegger, who became famous first as a
world-class bodybuilder, then later as a blockbuster motion
picture star, and more recently as the governor of California.
The dolls were sold in packaging that featured numerous pho-
tographs of Schwarzenegger and his name printed in large
letters across the box, much like a typical commercial product
such as a G.I. Joe doll. The Schwarzenegger dolls were sold
in at least one store in California.
The packaging displayed copyright-protected photo-
graphs of Schwarzenegger from various periods of his life, in-
cluding his professional bodybuilding days, his films, and his
political career.7 The packaging also featured a short biogra-
phy about Schwarzenegger that stated some dates concerning
his bodybuilding career, the titles and dates of several of his
movies, and some dates from his political career. The biogra-
5. See www.bosleybobbers.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
6. ODM admittedly obtains licenses from and pays royalties to non-
politicians whose names and likenesses it uses on bobblehead dolls, but does not
do so for politicians. See The Abrams Report (MSNBC television broadcast, May
18, 2004) (interviewing defendant Todd Bosley).
7. One of the photographs was owned by Schwarzenegger's company and
another belonged to the producer of the motion picture End of Days. ODM did
not obtain licenses to use those copyrights on the packaging. Similarly, ODM
did not seek or obtain Schwarzenegger's permission before using his name and
photographs on the packaging, and using his name and likeness in the product.
See The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction and Statement of
Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 549-51 (2005).
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phy also contained general personal information about
Schwarzenegger, including the date and place of his birth, the
date of his marriage, the names of his wife and four children
and the date he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In sum,
the packaging portrayed a product about Schwarzenegger the
man, rather than Schwarzenegger from any one particular
time period or career. The packaging also contained no politi-
cal message.
Inside the box was a doll featuring the likeness of
Schwarzenegger, wearing a suit and tie, and holding an as-
sault rifle and bandolier across his chest. The only text on
the doll reads: "ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER" on the base.
Had the doll been sold before 2003, one would likely have
concluded that the doll portrayed Schwarzenegger as a char-
acter from one of his movies in which his character might
have worn a suit and used an assault rifle.' In 2004, one is
not sure what to make of the Schwarzenegger doll wearing a
suit and holding a gun. With no discernable political message
on the doll, combined with the packaging focused on Schwar-
zenegger the man and the $19.99 price tag, the notion that
the product and its packaging are intended to further a par-
ticular political message is quite dubious. If the product and
packaging did in fact communicate some political message,
just what that message was is anyone's guess.
III. VIOLATION OF COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. History and Purpose of California ' Right of Publicity
Law
California, like most other states, has long recognized a
common law tort for violation of the right of publicity, i.e., the
unauthorized "appropriation, for the defendant's advantage,
of the plaintiffs name or likeness."9 The origins of the doc-
trine date back to an 1890 Harvard Law Reiew article by
Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis"° and a subsequent
8. See, e.g., TRUE LIES (20th Century Fox 1994).
9. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979) (internal ci-
tation omitted); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1983).
10. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
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New York statute" that proscribes unauthorized use of the
name, portrait or picture of any living person "for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade"2 and imposes criminal
and civil sanctions for its violation. 3 The modern conception
of the right of publicity was articulated by Professor Dean
Prosser in a 1960 law review article and subsequently recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court." Simply stated,
the right of publicity is "the inherent right of every human be-
ing to control the commercial use of his or her identity."' 5
In 1971, the California Legislature supplemented this
right when it enacted Civil Code section 3344, which provides
in part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or
in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of ad-
vertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods or services, without such person's
prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent
of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a
result thereof.'
6
In the words of the United States Supreme Court: "The
rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defen-
dant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay." 7 The
more popular a celebrity becomes, the greater the number of
people who recognize him or her, and the greater the visibility
11. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (2005).
12. Id. § 50.
13. Id. §§ 50, 51.
14. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571 n.7 (1977)
("One may be liable for 'appropriation' if he 'pirates the plaintiffs identity for
some advantage of his own'") (quoting Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383, 403 (1960)).
15. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3
(2d ed. 2005).
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2005). This statute complements the
preexisting California common law right of publicity; it does not replace or cod-
ify the common law. See id. at § 3344(g); see also Downing v. Abercrombie &
Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157
F.3d 686, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998).
17. Zacchimi, 433 U.S. at 576 (citation, quotations, and brackets omitted).
2005
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for products that bear (and/or are advertised using) the celeb-
rity's name or likeness. Considerable energy and ingenuity
are expended by those who have achieved celebrity value to
exploit it for profit, and right of publicity law protects the ce-
lebrity's sole right to exploit this value.
One California Supreme Court Justice explained:
An unauthorized commercial appropriation of one's iden-
tity converts the potential economic value in that identity
to another's advantage. The user is enriched, reaping one
of the benefits of the celebrity's investment in himself.
The loss may well exceed the mere denial of compensation
for the use of the individual's identity. The unauthorized
use disrupts the individual's effort to control his public
image, and may substantially alter that image. The indi-
vidual may be precluded from future promotions in that as
well as other fields. Further, while a judicious involve-
ment in commercial promotions may have been perceived
as an important ingredient in one's career, uncontrolled
exposure may be dysfunctional. As a result, the develop-
ment of his initial vocation-his profession-may be ar-
rested. Finally, if one's identity is exploited without per-
mission to promote products similar to those which the
individual has already endorsed, . . . [this] will probably
diminish the value of the endorsement. 18
Commercial misappropriation may take many forms in-
cluding use of one's name, likeness or both on merchandise.
Courts have routinely found liability where the unpermitted
use takes the form of goods such as "T-shirts, dishes, ash-
trays, drinking mugs and the like." 9 "[S]uch commercial
products as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, tar-
get games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods"-as
well as bobblehead dolls-"are not vehicles through which
ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated."2 ° By contrast,
"books and movies are vehicles through which ideas and opin-
ions are disseminated and, as such, have enjoyed certain con-
stitutional protections, not generally accorded 'merchan-
18. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 438 (internal citations omitted).
19. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, 2 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
7:21 (2d. ed. 2005).
20. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 463 (Cal. 1979)
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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dise.,,21
Most celebrities invest "considerable money, time and en-
ergy" to develop prominence in their particular field.2 2 "Simi-
larly, political figures have worked hard to build a public im-
age [... .] To deny protection to a political figure simply
because he has chosen to involve himself in politics is un-
fair. 22
B. Public Affairs Exception
Under both common law and the statutory right of pub-
licity in California, "no cause of action will lie for the publica-
tion of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right
of the public to know and the freedom of the press to tell it.
24
Here, the Schwarzenegger doll and packaging feature no
political slogans, such as "Vote for Schwarzenegger," "Oppose
Schwarzenegger," or otherwise. Neither do they communi-
cate any other discernable political message. Nor does the
doll or its packaging constitute a news account or other form
of "public affairs." Rather, they are merely a depiction or imi-
tation of Schwarzenegger in the form of a doll-a commercial
product-and its packaging; both lacking a political mes-
sage."
Although a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not
21. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
22. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
23. Eileen R. Rielly, Note, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, 46 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (1985) (emphasis added).
24. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001 (quoting Montana v. San Jose Mercury
News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995)). California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344(d) similarly provides: "For purposes of this section, a use of a name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness in connection with any news, public af-
fairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not consti-
tute a use for which consent is required." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 2005).
25. The Abrams Report, supra note 6 (UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh
told Dan Abrams, when asked about possible First Amendment protections for
the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll: "it's not an obvious case for parody in part
because while they show him say with bandolier and a weapon, you know, that's
actually pretty close to his actual movie persona . . . so it looks like kind of a
straight out depiction, albeit in a bobblehead"); see also John Broder, Schwar-
zenegger Files Suit Against Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at
A16 (according to Professor Volokh, "[i]f someone's image is used without much
transformation, if it's not a parody or commentary, that is indeed legally action-
able, and under that theory Arnold has a very good claim").
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a condition of constitutional protection,26 the absence of such a
message here means that ODM cannot hide behind the public
affairs exception; the bobblehead is not exempt from liability
if it is not a "publication of matters in the public interest."27
ODM could argue that, by purchasing the product, buyers of
the bobblehead were supporting some sort of political "mes-
sage," such as a purported commentary on Schwarzenegger's
gun control policy. Such an argument would be belied, how-
ever, by ODM's own admission that it depicted Schwarzeneg-
ger as carrying a gun "just to show his character. Seems like
every time you see him, he has a gun."28 Moreover, "[a]lmost
every commercial use of a political figure's identity contains
the potential for 'speech' by the buyer. But a line must be
drawn, or everyone involved in the political scene would be
fair game for any and all commercially exploitative uses."29
The fact that the packaging features a short biography of
Schwarzenegger's life does not render the product a "news ac-
count" or other "public affairs" communication under the law.
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar argument and
held that an Abercrombie & Fitch clothing catalog that in-
cluded an article about surfing did not render the unauthor-
ized use of photographs of the plaintiffs-surfers in the catalog
protected under the public affairs exception." The court ruled
that, although the theme of surfing and surf culture is a mat-
ter of public interest, "the illustrative use of Appellants' pho-
tograph does not contribute significantly to a matter of the
public interest and that Abercrombie cannot avail itself of the
First Amendment defense."'
Similarly, although Schwarzenegger and his life may be a
26. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc, 21 P.3d at 804
("a work of art is protected by the First Amendment even if it conveys no dis-
cernable message").
27. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotations and citation omitted);
Cf, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) ("That defendants' movie may convey a barely discernible
message does not entitle them to appropriate plaintiffs trademark in the proc-
ess of conveying that message.").
28. Dan Smith, Bobbleheads will roll, governor's lawyers say, SACRAMENTO
BEE, May 1, 2004, at Al (quoting company spokesperson Tami Rike).
29. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 4:26 (emphasis omitted).
30. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002.
31. Id.
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matter of public interest, the inclusion of a short biography
about him in a commercial product does not automatically
render the product and its packaging protected free speech. If
that were the case, every commercial product using an unau-
thorized name, photograph or likeness of a famous person
could evade the right of publicity law simply by featuring a
short bio about the person depicted. Fortunately for those
whose names and images are the constant target of infringe-
ment, courts recognize attempts to legitimize commercial
misappropriation by tacking onto the product or its packaging
a "biography" or other form of "legitimate" speech in an effort
to re-characterize the infringement as protected free speech."
[I]f all it took for a defendant to wrap itself in the First
Amendment was to add an appropriate "Express Your
Support for _" slogan on all celebrity merchandise,
then the right of a celebrity to control the commercial
property value in his or her identity would be destroyed.
The First Amendment would be the vehicle for legalizing
commercial theft.33
C. Political Figures
The notion that political figures have no right to control
the commercial use of their names and images contradicts
both the letter and purpose of right of publicity laws. If the
law did not apply to political figures, companies could freely
exploit politicians' names and images in advertising for their
products, or on the products themselves, with impunity.
George W. Bush toothbrushes and Dick Cheney laundry de-
tergent, for example, could pervade our supermarkets and
households.
As one real-life example, after his unsuccessful bid for
the Presidency, former U.S. Senator Bob Dole appeared in a
string of commercial advertisements for Viagra, Visa, and
Pepsi, and presumably was paid a substantial amount of
money for each.' The law certainly does not support the
32. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144,
146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (board game); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978) ("memorial" poster).
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 7:21 (internal citation omitted).
34. See Hilary Cassidy, How the Mighty Have Risen or Fallen, BRANDWEEK,
Nov. 10, 2003. An advertisement by Pfizer (the maker of Viagra) featuring Sen.
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proposition that each of these companies had the right to use
Senator Dole's name and image in their advertisements ear-
lier, while he was running for President in 1996-without his
permission and without paying him-simply because he was
an elected official and presumably exempt from right of pub-
licity laws.35 No law in America, statutory or case law, sup-
ports such a conclusion.
While ODM claims that it obtains appropriate licenses
and pays royalties to the non-political celebrities depicted on
its other bobblehead dolls, it contends that licenses and royal-
ties are unnecessary for politicians, who are allegedly "part of
the public domain." 6 The concept of the public domain is
sometimes invoked in connection with copyright law to denote
the passage of works out of legal protection and into the
realm in which they may be freely exploited.37 As applied to
the right of publicity, the phrase would suggest that the iden-
tities of certain individuals receive no protection whatsoever
against commercial appropriation.8 This is so for an individ-
ual who lives in a state or country that does not recognize
rights of publicity at all," or a deceased person whose public-
Dole is attached. See Appendix B, Photo One, infra p. 677.
35. In the days and weeks leading up to the November 2, 2004 Presidential
election, fast food chain Carl's Jr. ran a national television commercial featuring
the images of President George W. Bush, his challenger Senator John Kerry,
former President Bill Clinton, and several other prominent U.S. politicians.
The ad contained no political message; the only message was to buy the adver-
tiser's "Double Six Dollar Burger." The images of the politicians were used to
attract the attention of television viewers during a hotly-contested political cli-
mate, and likely were an infringement of the politicians' publicity rights-their
right to control the use of their images for commercial purposes. Whether Bush,
Kerry, Clinton and the others choose to enforce their rights against Carl's Jr. is
another matter, and if they choose to look the other way, it certainly does not
mean their rights do not exist.
36. See, e.g., Christian Berthelsen, Governor Bent Out of Shape Over Bob-
bler, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 1, 2004, at B3 (according to defendant Todd Bosley,
"Arnold Schwarzenegger as a governor is considered public domain"); Smith,
supra note 28 (ODM spokesperson stating "[Arnold Schwarzenegger]'s in the
public domain").
37. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2002).
38. See Nicholas J. Jollymore, Expiration of the Right of Publicity-When
Symbolic Names and Images Pass into the Public Domain, 84 TRADEMARK REP.
125 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1031 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), afl'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Princess Diana's persona is 'in
the public domain to the extent that the absence of a right of publicity relin-
quishes the celebrity persona to the public domain.").
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ity rights are not accorded post-mortem protection.40  But
ODM's suggestion that the identities of the thousands of fed-
eral, state and local politicians in the United States are not
entitled to protection equal to that of every other person in
this nation is unprecedented and unsupportable.
Political figures have usually invested much time,
money, and effort in building up a public image, just as
entertainers have. Few people are simply thrust into the
political arena. By their own labors, in a very competitive
field, political figures have created publicity value in their
names and faces.
Of course, it can be argued that the public gives the po-
litical figure publicity value-he would not be a valuable
commodity if it were not for the public's recognition. The
same argument has, however, been made in the case of en-
tertainers, but courts have protected the celebrity because
of the large investment he has made in his career. Politi-
cal figures likewise have made large investments in their
careers and deserve similar protection.41
"The decision to enter the political arena should not for-
ever foreclose a person from realizing the financial benefits of
fame.' 2
1. Martin Luther KIng Plastic Busts
Few courts have had an opportunity to rule on an unau-
thorized commercial use of a political figure's name or like-
ness.43 Politicians do not typically pursue such claims, per-
haps because they are not so concerned with commercial use
40. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956,
957 (6th Cir. 1980) (right of publicity not inheritable under Tennessee law;
"[a]fter death the opportunity for gain shifts to the public domain, where it is
equally open to all"); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 9:2[C] (At some
point after a person's death, "the person's identity should enter the public do-
main as a part of history and folklore.").
41. Rielly, supra note 23, at 1170-71.
42. Id. at 1171.
43. See Xenia P. Kobylarz, Governor, Doll Settle, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug.
3, 2004, at 1 ("California law is silent when it comes to the publicity rights of
public officials"); James D. Nguyen & Michael B. Moore, Will Court Allow Gov-
ernor to Terminate Bobblehead Doll L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, July 2, 2004, at 7
("no published California decision has addressed the specific question of
whether elected officials have publicity rights. Case law in other jurisdictions is
equally scarce").
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of their image (it is not their typical business), or they do not
wish to invest the resources into pursuing such claims, or
they avoid possible negative publicity for doing so.i In Mar-
tin Luther If'ng, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Products, Inc., which involved facts similar to
those at issue here, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that
the unauthorized sale of plastic busts of Dr. King was a viola-
tion of his post-mortem right of publicity, owned by his es-
tate.45
In King, the manufacturer had first sought permission
from Dr. King's estate to make and sell the plastic busts.46
Despite the estate's refusal, the company manufactured and
sold the products anyway, and reportedly donated a portion of
the proceeds to the King Center for.,Social Change.47 Dr.
King's estate brought suit for infringement of the post-
mortem right of publicity, and the Georgia Supreme Court
sided with the plaintiff. The court stated that Dr. King was a
"public figure," though not a "public official," and thereby lim-
ited its decision to "public figures who are neither public offi-
cials nor entertainers."48 The court went on to discuss cases
in which various types of persons, including sports figures,
movie stars, exotic dancers and private citizens, have been af-
forded the right of publicity.49 The Court concluded:
We know of no reason why a public figure prominent in re-
ligion and civil rights should be entitled to less protection
than an exotic dancer or a movie actress. Therefore, we
hold that the appropriation of another's name and like-
ness, whether such likeness be a photograph or sculpture,
without consent and for the financial gain of the appro-
44. The federal district in the Rudy Giuliani case (discussed infra Part
III.C.2) reported that its "review of scores of right to publicity cases from across
the country does not reveal any such claims by a high-level public official." N.Y.
Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aifd,
136 F.3d 123 (1998).
45. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
46. Id. at 698.
47. Similarly, in the Schwarzenegger case, ODM claimed it was donating a
portion of the bobblehead sales to a cancer charity, though the claim was never
verified. Even so, as the King court ruled, there is no exception to the right of
publicity law for infringers who donate a portion of the profits, rather than re-
tain the profits entirely. See id. at 698-99.
48. Id. at 700.
49. Id. at 700-02.
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priator is a tort in Georgia, whether the person whose
name and likeness is used is a private citizen, entertainer,
or as here a public figure who is not a public official.50
Although the Georgia Supreme Court stopped short of
applying the right of publicity to public officials because that
issue was not before it, commentators on the King holding
have opined that extension of the doctrine to public officials is
a logical step and consistent with the purpose of the right of
publicity doctrine. One commentator writes: "Martin Luther
King was undeniably involved in politics, although he never
held public office. Therefore, in spite of its attempt to limit
its holding, the court, in effect, held that a political figure has
a right of publicity."5 Two other legal scholars, including law
professor Lionel S. Sobel, argue that a defendant who appro-
priates the name and likeness of another person for commer-
cial purposes and economic advantage should not be allowed
to take refuge behind the First Amendment's guarantees of
speech and press freedom simply because the defendant se-
lects a public official as the individual whose commercial and
economic rights are to be usurped: 'We are dealing with noth-
ing more than commercial interests and economic gain as the
purpose of and motive for the appropriation, and it should
make no difference whether the name or likeness appropri-
ated is that of a ballplayer, a Vice President or even a Presi-
dent.
52
2. Rudy Giuliani Advertisements
In 1998, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority
("MTA") could not stop the publisher of New York Magazine
50. Id. at 703.
51. Rielly, supra note 23, at 1163.
52. Albert F. Smith & Lionel S. Sobel, The Mickey Mouse Watch Goes to
Washington: Would the Law Stop the Clock, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 346
(1972). However, the authors also note that "where the matter involves a public
official as prominent and as controversial as the Vice President, there may not
be a clear dividing line between commercial products and a 'product' having
overtones of symbolic speech, possibly evoking constitutional protection." Id at
347; but see Frank Leo Brunetti, Comment, Invasion of Pivacy-Recovery for
Nonconsentual Use of Photographs in Motion Pictures Based on the Appropria-
tion of Property, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 358, 377 (1973) ("Even the President of the
United States could sue for appropriation if his photograph was used on a tee-
shirt [sic] or poster.").
5692005
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
from running a bus advertising campaign that used the name
of Mayor Rudy Giuliani only days after he won the mayoral
race.5" The advertisement featured the magazine's logo and
read, "[p]ossibly the only good thing in New York Rudy hasn't
taken credit for."54 The court held that the MTA, as a gov-
ernment agency, could not stop the bus advertisement be-
cause doing so would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.55
However, the court suggested that Guiliani himself might
have a potential claim for violation of his right of publicity.56
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the content of the
advertisement came close to, if not within, the "public affairs"
exception because it referenced an issue that was the subject
of debate in the very recent mayoral race, namely, whether
Mayor Guilaini improperly took credit for certain accom-
plishments.57 On the other hand, a dissenting judge on the
Second Circuit panel firmly concluded that the New York
Magazine advertisement "plainly violate[d]" the New York
right of publicity statute.58 The judge rejected any potential
defenses based on incidental use, public interest or satire.59
3. Franklin D. Roosevelt Cigars
In the 1936 case of Prest v. Stein, a company sold "Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt" cigars, utilizing the name and image of then-
President Roosevelt.' ° An unfair trade practice claim was
brought on behalf of President Roosevelt in Wisconsin but
53. See N.Y. Magazine, 136 F.3d 123.
54. Id. at 125.
55. Id. at 131-32 ("A prior prohibition of the Advertisement is certainly
more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest asserted
here, particularly where... requiring MTA to display the Advertisement would
not result in irreparable harm to MTA.").
56. See id. at 132 ("[New York Civil Rights Law] Section 51 already provides
remedies for violation of [section] 50, which may be asserted by the person who
feels his rights are affected. If [section] 50 does protect Mayor Giuliani from the
use of his name in this Advertisement, he may seek redress under [section] 51..
57. "While the Advertisement served to promote the sales of a magazine, it
just as clearly criticized the most prominent member of the City's government
on an issue relevant to his performance of office, subtly calling into question
whether the Mayor is actually responsible for the successes of the City for which
he claims credit." Id. at 131.
58. Id. at 132.
59. See N.Y Magazine, 136 F.3d at 132-33 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
60. See Prest v. Stein, 265 N.W. 85 (Wis. 1936).
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dismissed because, as of 1936, neither federal law nor Wis-
consin state law recognized the right of publicity doctrine."
Apparently there is no federal statute securing to an indi-
vidual the right to the exclusive use of his name and pho-
tograph. Wisconsin has no such statute. In the absence of
such a statute, it was not unlawful for the defendant to
use the name and portrait of the President for advertising
purposes. The fact that it is in poor taste and shocks our
sense of propriety that the name and portrait of the chief
magistrate of the nation should be so used does not make
62it illegal and unlawful.
Legal commentator J. Thomas McCarthy finds the court's
decision outdated and incorrect under the modern concept of
a right of publicity.63 He believes that society would recognize
the advertisement as "a blatant and exploitative use of the
President's identity to draw attention to a commercial adver-
tisement. ' 4
D. Transformative Use
1. California Standards
There is an inherent tension between the right of public-
ity and the right of freedom of expression under the First
Amendment, which becomes particularly acute when the per-
son seeking to enforce the right is a famous actor, athlete,
politician, or otherwise famous person."
In California, the applicable test for determining whether
an unauthorized use of a person's name, likeness or both in
an expressive work is protected by the First Amendment is
known as the "transformative use" test.66 In 2001, the Cali-
61. Id. at 87.
62. Id.
63. McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 4:26.
64. Id.
65. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003).
66. Other jurisdictions currently utilize various standards when balancing
publicity rights against the First Amendment. For instance, the Missouri Su-
preme Court recently adopted a "predominant use test," which states:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial
value of an individual's identity, that product should be held to violate
the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment,
even if there is some 'expressive' content in it that might qualify as
'speech' in other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant
2005
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fornia Supreme Court held that when an artistic work "adds
significant creative elements so as to be transformed into
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation,"
First Amendment protection of the work outweighs whatever
interest the state may have in enforcing the right of public-
ity.67 Conversely, "[w]hen artistic expression takes the form
of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial
gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity without
adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state
law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs
the expressive interests of the imitative artist."68 Applying
this new "transformative use" test, the Court concluded that
an artist's rendering of the likenesses of The Three Stooges,
and use of that image on lithographs and T-shirts which he
sold, was not entitled to First Amendment protection because
the Court could discern no significant transformative or crea-
tive contribution in the artist's work. 9
In close cases, the California Supreme Court prescribed
the use of another, subsidiary inquiry: "[D]oes the market-
ability and economic value of the challenged work derive pri-
marily from the fame of the celebrity depicted?"7" If this ques-
tion is answered in the negative, then there is generally no
actionable violation of the right of publicity. If the question is
answered in the affirmative, however, it does not necessarily
follow that the work is without First Amendment protection,
purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on or about a
celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (internal citation omit-
ted). The Tenth Circuit has utilized a balancing test that involves "examining
the importance of [the defendant's] right to free expression and the conse-
quences of limiting that right" and then weighing "those consequences against
the effect of infringing on [the plaintiffs] right of publicity." Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996). Bor-
rowing standards from several other jurisdictions, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals also seems to have created a sort of balancing test that weighs the sub-
stantiality and effect of the defendant's use against the informational and crea-
tive content of that use. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937-38.
67. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808.
68. Id.
69. "His undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of
creating literal, conventional depictions of The Three Stooges so as to exploit
their fame." Id. at 409. A copy of the artist's depiction of The Three Stooges is
attached. See Appendix B, Photo Two, infra p. 677.
70. Id. at 407.
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as it may still be a transformative work.7'
In Winter v. DC Comics, 72 the California Supreme Court
reached an opposite result when applying its "transformative
use" test to comic books containing villainous half-human,
half-worm characters that evoked the first names and dis-
torted likenesses of musicians Johnny and Edgar Winter.
The Court concluded that the comic books contained signifi-
cant creative elements that transformed the characters into
something more than mere celebrity likenesses.7 '3 The comic
books did not depict Johnny and Edgar Winter literally; in-
stead, the plaintiffs were merely part of the raw materials
used to synthesize the comic books. The court commented
that any resemblance of the drawings to the plaintiffs was
distorted for purposes of lampoon, parody or caricature. Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that the characters and their por-
trayals did not greatly threaten the plaintiffs' rights of public-
ity because fans of the plaintiffs who want to purchase
pictures of them would find the drawings of the Autumn
brothers unsatisfactory as a substitute for conventional depic-
tions. Accordingly, the court held that the comic books were
entitled to First Amendment protection.74
2. Application of the "Tranformative Use" Test
Here, the question is whether the ODM dolls featuring
the name and likeness of Schwarzenegger, and the packaging
featuring his name and photographs constitute a "literal de-
piction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly
trespassing on the right of publicity without adding signifi-
cant expression beyond that trespass,"' like the artistic ren-
derings of The Three Stooges in Comedy III, or rather if they
"add[] significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imita-
tion,"" like the half-worm creatures with the distorted like-
nesses of the Winter brothers, as in the Winter case.
Applying the test to the packaging, there is no question
71. Id.
72. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
73. Seeid. at 479.
74. See id.
75. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 799.
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that the use of Schwarzenegger's identity is nothing more
than the literal reproduction of his name and photographs to
promote a commercial product for financial gain. The name
and photographs are not distorted or otherwise "transformed"
from the literal depiction of Schwarzenegger's name and ex-
act image. Nothing on the packaging shows an image of the
doll inside-with a suit and gun-thus the packaging cannot
take advantage of any argument that could be made for the
doll itself. Because the images and graphics on the packag-
ing, by its very nature, are used to commercially promote the
product inside, the unauthorized use of Schwarzenegger's
name and photographs on the packaging constitutes a viola-
tion of Schwarzenegger's publicity rights.
A First Amendment argument has a slightly better
chance regarding the doll itself, but not by much. The use of
Schwarzenegger's name and likeness on the doll is little more
than an "imitation" of Schwarzenegger. The fact that the doll
wears a suit and carries a gun and bandolier does not neces-
sarily "transform" the doll from an imitation of Schwarzeneg-
ger into "something else." It is still an imitation. The suit is
perhaps meant to reference Schwarzenegger's political career,
and the gun and bandolier might have been intended to in-
voke his motion picture career, perhaps from movies such as
Commandd& or Predato?8 where his character used such
weaponry. The doll could also be an attempt to depict a char-
acter from one of Schwarzenegger's movies who wore a suit
and carried a gun, such as in True Lies.79 As ODM's own
spokesperson acknowledged, Schwarzenegger (in his motion
pictures) is frequently seen with a gun, and thus the presence
of a gun in the doll's hands was "just to show his character."0
Whatever the allusion, the doll remains an imitation of
Schwarzenegger. As the packaging seems to suggest, the doll
might be an imitation of Schwarzenegger the man who moved
from a motion picture career into a political career. The use
of Schwarznegger's publicity rights on dolls sold for $19.99 on
websites and in stores, packaged in boxes, and totally devoid
77. COMMANDO (20th Century Fox 1985).
78. PREDATOR (20th Century Fox 1987).
79. TRuE LIES (20th Century Fox 1994).
80. Smith, supra note 28, and accompanying text (quoting ODM spokesper-
son).
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of any "transformative" elements, is very similar to the con-
ventional depiction of The Three Stooges images placed on T-
shirts and lithographs and sold to the public, which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held to be non-transformative and
unlawful."1
The doll at issue does not approach the "transformative"
quality of the distorted likenesses of the Winter brothers who
were depicted as villainous half-worm creatures that wreaked
havoc and ultimately had to be destroyed. 2 The added crea-
tive elements of the worm-like characters are enormous,
whereas the added, supposedly creative elements of depicting
Schwarzenegger in a suit with a gun and ammunition belt are
minimal, particularly given his prior career as an action mo-
tion picture star. The Schwarzenegger doll is far more a
commercial celebrity imitation, for purposes of profiting off a
major world-wide celebrity, than it is a "transformative" use
as articulated in the Winter case.
Moreover, one of the factors in Winter and Comedy III
was whether the celebrity's right of commercial exploitation
of his name or image might be damaged by the unauthorized
use." The California Supreme Court reasoned that the Win-
ter brothers were not damaged because their fans were not
likely to purchase the comic book in order to see an image of
them.84 By contrast, fans of The Three Stooges might likely
purchase one of the T-shirts or lithographs sold by the artist
in that case, because the image was much more of a literal
depiction of the celebrities and, thus, the products were cut-
ting into the market for any products that might be offered by
the celebrities' authorized licensee(s). 5 Here, the Schwar-
zenegger doll and packaging fall into the latter category.
Fans of Schwarzenegger are the likely buyers of dolls with his
81. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811.
82. See Winter, 69 P.3d at 479. A copy of a page from the comic book is at-
tached. See Appendix B, Photo Three, infra p. 678.
83. See Comedy IIIProds., Inc., 21 P.3d at 800; Winter, 69 P.3d at 477.
84. Winter, 69 P.3d at 479 ("Plaintiffs' fans who want to purchase pictures
of them would find the drawings of the Autumn brothers unsatisfactory as a
substitute for conventional depictions"); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21
P.3d at 808 ("works of parody or other distortions of the celebrity figure are not,
from the celebrity fan's viewpoint, good substitutes for conventional depictions
of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect").
85. See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811.
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name and image, thus diminishing Schwarzenegger's ability
to license his publicity rights for similar commercial products.
E. Parody
California's "transformative use" test does not distin-
guish between parody and non-parody uses of name or like-
ness because the Winter court found these categories irrele-
vant.86 Instead of inquiring into whether the work is parody,
satire, caricature, serious social commentary or any other
specific form of expression, the court determines whether the
work is transformative.87
If the parody defense ever existed in commercial Califor-
nia misappropriation cases (as opposed to copyright infringe-
ment cases, where the defense is actually recognized),88 the
defense has now been incorporated into and replaced by the
"transformative use" test. As explained above, the Schwar-
zenegger doll and packaging at issue are not "transforma-
tive," and therefore are not protected free speech; rather, they
are celebrity imitations made for commercial purposes, and
thus are actionable.8 9
In addition, even if parody were recognized as a defense
to violation of the right of publicity, the packaging and doll at
issue here do not qualify. The packaging suggests no ele-
ments of a parody; rather, it suggests that it contains a le-
gitimate commercial product inside. Similarly, the doll
lacked elements of parody. Instead, as discussed previously,
and as the packaging suggests, the doll was a depiction or
imitation of Schwarzenegger the man in a commercial prod-
uct sold for $19.99, for the purpose of profiting from one of the
most well-known celebrities in the world. ° The doll lacked
any discernable message, political, parody, or otherwise.
ODM's spokesperson even admitted that the doll depicted
Schwarzenegger holding a gun for identification purposes,
and not for parody.8 '
86. See Winter, 69 P.3d at 479.
87. See id.
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
89. See discussion supra Part III.D.2.
90. See id.
91. Smith, supra note 28, and accompanying text (quoting ODM spokesper-
son).
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Moreover, if a company could use a politician's name and
likeness without authorization and hide behind a "parody"
argument, it would open the doors to wholesale commercial
infringement of politicians' publicity rights. For example,
Pfizer could use the name and photograph of Senator Bob
Dole-without his permission and without paying him-in an
erectile dysfunction advertisement for Viagra, and justify it is
a "parody." As previously stated, no law in America supports
such a result. Similarly, a depiction or imitation of Schwar-
zenegger on a doll and its packaging, lacking any discernable
message, does not constitute a parody, or otherwise justify
the commercial exploitation his name and image without au-
92thorization or compensation.
F. Fair Use
ODM cannot defend its actions as a "fair use" of Schwar-
zenegger's name and likeness because California law recog-
nizes no such defense to claims for violation of the right of
publicity." While some commentators have recommended
importing a fair use defense from copyright law,94 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court ultimately declined to do so, reasoning
that "a wholesale importation of the fair use doctrine into
right of publicity law would not be advisable.""9 As Professor
McCarthy has noted: "It seems strange to propose to bring
92. In White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992), the Ninth Circuit quickly rejected a "parody" defense offered by the de-
fendants in a right of publicity action brought by Vanna White of television
game show Wheel of Fortune. White sued when Samsung ran an advertisement
depicting a robot dressed in a wig, gown and jewelry posed next to a game board
recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune set. The Ninth Circuit stated:
This case involves a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling
Samsung VCRs. The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is
subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message:
'buy Samsung VCRs.'... The difference between a 'parody' and a
'knock-off is the difference between fun and profit.
Id. at 1401. Similarly, here, the Schwarzenegger bobblehead doll was created for
profit and any "parody" aspects are only tangentially related to the doll's pri-
mary purpose of generating a commercial profit for ODM.
93. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 807.
94. Id (citing Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of
Publicity, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 635, 650-57 (1995); Randall T. E. Coyne, Toward
a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 781, 812-20 (1988)).
95. Id.
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clarity to Right of Publicity law by importing into it some un-
definably modified version of one of the most obscure and un-
predictable aspects of copyright law."9 McCarthy concludes,
"the copyright concept of 'fair use' is one of the last places to
look to find clarity and predictability. It should be invoked
only as a last resort after all other solutions have been tried
and found wanting."97
IV. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
ODM unjustifiably infringed the copyrights of the photo-
graphs that it printed on the product packaging. As dis-
cussed previously, the packaging for the Schwarzenegger doll
at issue featured two copyrighted photographs of Schwar-
zenegger: one photo owned by his company and another
owned by the producer of the motion picture End ofDays." A
copyright infringement lawsuit was brought by Schwarzeneg-
ger's company, Fitness Publications, Inc., as owner of one
photo and assignee of the right to sue for infringement of the
other.
A. Ownership and Copying
To establish copyright infringement, two elements must
be proven: ownership of a valid copyright and copying of con-
stituent elements of the work that are original.99 There is no
dispute that Schwarzenegger's company was the owner of the
two pictures for purposes of the copyright infringement litiga-
tion. ODM plainly used the photos, without authorization,
when it reproduced them on the bobblehead box.1"' Thus,
there cannot be any serious controversy as to the defendant's
prima facie liability. The only remaining question, then, is
96. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, at § 8:6[D].
97. Id. (citing Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 58 (1994)
("automatic invocation of the copyright fair use framework in cases presenting a
conflict between the First Amendment and the right of publicity is inappropri-
ate")).
98. See discussion supra Part I.
99. See Feist Pub. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 548
(1985)).
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (2000) (copyright owner has exclusive right to
reproduce the work); id. § 501(a).
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whether its conduct could be justified by an affirmative de-
fense such as fair use.
B. Fair Use
Under federal copyright law, the limited doctrine of fair
use permits courts "to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster."'' This doctrine, which
is intended to protect uses for "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . .. scholarship, or re-
search,""1 2 has no application to the bobblehead case and
would not excuse ODM from its liability for willfully infring-
ing the copyrights in the photographs.
ODM's use of Schwarzenegger's name and likeness was
purely commercial in nature; it was product packaging used
to dress up an article of commerce. 13 Although the defendant
might argue that the brief "biography" of Schwarzenegger on
the box is some sort of commentary or news reporting, that is
beside the point. The product for sale-the item that con-
sumers desired and that ODM sold for $19.99-was the doll
itself, not the text on the box. The defendant merely used the
pictures as a vehicle to sell what was inside the package.0 4
Photographs are a type of creative work, which generally
receive stronger protection under the fair use analysis than
do predominantly informational works.'0 ' The defendant also
101. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Copyright Act sets forth four non-exclusive factors
to be considered in determining whether a fair use was made of a work: "(1) the
purpose and character of the use .. .(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used . . .and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. "All are
to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
103. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 ("every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the mo-
nopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright") (quoting Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
104. See Nguyen & Moore, supra note 43 ("In the copyright arena, using part
of a public official's work for commentary may be lawful, but selling that offi-
cial's work for commercial gain is generally not. Ohio Discount Merchandise will
have a tough time convincing a court that it used Schwarzenegger's photo-
graphs for news or commentary.").
105. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990); see also Rogers v.
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used almost the entirety of the photographs rather than just
a small portion of each. "Nor does it appear the company
transformed the photographs, making a parody defense diffi-
cult.""°' In sum, this purely commercial use of the pictures as
product adornment comes nowhere close to the comment,
criticism and other similar purposes that fair use protects.
V. CONCLUSION
Opportunistic freeriders should not be permitted to profit
at the expense of hard-working individuals, including politi-
cians, who have invested enormous amounts of time and en-
ergy into building value in their names and likenesses. While
the public is of course free to comment on and criticize our
elected officials in print, broadcast, art and elsewhere, mer-
chandisers cannot abuse the Constitution to immunize bla-
tantly commercial, non-transformative exploitation of those
same individuals' identities purely for profit. "The first
amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized
rights in intellectual property.,
107
Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
106. Nguyen & Moore, supra note 43.
107. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d
1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
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